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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 13-4779 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RAMIL KISMAT, 
Appellant 
_______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1:11-cr-00301-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 
June 13, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO and BARRY, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,
1
 Judge. 
 
(Opinion Filed: June 20, 2014) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
RESTANI, Judge 
Appellant Ramil Kismat appeals his conviction for bank fraud and wire fraud as 
well as various aspects of his sentence.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm. 
                                                          
1
 The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International Trade, 
sitting by designation. 
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I. 
 Appellant Kismat and his co-defendant at trial Sergey Sorokin (together, “the 
defendants”) were charged with bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012), wire 
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028(a)(7), and aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).  The 
defendants allegedly used numerous compromised credit and debit card numbers over a 
period of several months to make purchases at various retail establishments, mostly in 
Pennsylvania.  Despite counsel’s arguments at trial that the defendants were unaware that 
the cards used to make those purchases were encoded with compromised account 
numbers, a jury convicted Kismat and Sorokin on the bank fraud and wire fraud charges.
2
  
Kismat ultimately was sentenced to 64 months of incarceration. 
Kismat raises seven issues on appeal.  Specifically, he claims that: (1) the district 
court committed reversible error by providing a “willful blindness” instruction; (2) the 
court committed plain error by failing to give a jury instruction regarding the good faith 
defense; (3) the court committed plain error in its bank fraud jury instruction; (4) the 
cumulative error of the failure to instruct the jury on the good faith defense and the 
deficiency in the bank fraud instruction warrants reversal; (5) there was insufficient 
evidence presented at trial to prove that Kismat had the requisite mens rea to commit 
bank fraud and wire fraud; (6) the court erred in its calculation of the intended loss for 
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 Sorokin’s appeal of his sentence is docketed as case number 13-3955. 
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purposes of sentencing; and (7) the court erred in its calculation of the number of victims 
for purposes of sentencing.  We will address each claim in turn.
3
 
II. 
 Kismat first claims that the district court erred by providing a “willful blindness” 
instruction to the jury.  He argues that the evidence at trial did not warrant that 
instruction.  We review a challenge to the district court’s determination that the evidence 
supported the giving of a willful blindness instruction for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 2010).  In determining whether the 
evidence was sufficient to warrant the instruction, we view the evidence and reasonable 
inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the government.  Id.  The 
evidence here was sufficient to warrant the instruction. 
Kismat claimed at trial, and continues to argue, that he did not know that the cards 
he was using contained compromised account information.  Evidence presented at trial, 
however, indicated that Kismat was not using the cards in good faith, or at best, 
consciously avoided learning about the propriety of the cards.  On several occasions, he 
drove from the New York/New Jersey area to central Pennsylvania to use the cards at 
common retailers such as Target.  He would make a handful of transactions at the store, 
using multiple cards and often switching registers, and then would move on to another 
store where he would repeat the same activity.  The purchases were often prepaid Visa or 
                                                          
3
 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction over Sorokin’s conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and sentencing under 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
4 
 
 
MasterCard gift cards that required an additional activation fee.  Kismat told police that 
he liked to use these prepaid cards to purchase other merchandise; but by engaging in the 
additional step of purchasing the prepaid gift cards instead of using his own supposedly 
legitimate card to purchase the merchandise directly, Kismat was wasting money because 
he had to incur the additional activation fees.  Taken together, Kismat’s defense that he 
was unaware that the cards he was using were fraudulent and his actions indicating that 
he was trying to obscure his use of the cards to obtain items of value warranted giving the 
jury a willful blindness instruction.  See United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 256–
58 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that denial of knowledge regarding true nature of money 
laundering scheme combined with actions taken to conceal involvement in the scheme 
was sufficient to warrant willful blindness instruction).
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III. 
Kismat next argues that the district court committed plain error by failing to 
instruct the jury on the good faith defense.  He correctly notes that the existence of good 
faith negates the intent-to-defraud element required for bank fraud and wire fraud.  See 
United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 75 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Al Hedaithy, 
392 F.3d 580, 590 (3d Cir. 2004).  Reversal under the plain error standard is warranted 
                                                          
4
 Kismat also argues in his reply brief that the instruction was erroneous because it did 
not include any language that advised the jury that it was permitted, but not required, to 
draw any inferences from the evidence on this issue.  Because this argument was not 
raised in his opening brief, we will not consider it.  See Ethypharm S.A. Fr. v. Abbott 
Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 231 n.13 (3d Cir. 2013).  In any event, we note that the district court 
instructed that the jury “may” find the knowledge requirement met by evidence proving 
willful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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only if there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) the error affects substantial rights, and 
(4) the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 500 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted).   
We have upheld refusals to give a separate good faith instruction when the 
instructions, “taken as a whole, adequately define[] the elements of the crime, including 
the intent requirement, thereby making a good faith instruction unnecessary and 
redundant.”  United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 651 (3d Cir. 2006).  The district court 
defined the elements of each crime, including the requirement that Kismat act with an 
intent to defraud, which the district court defined as “knowingly and with the intention or 
the purpose to deceive or to cheat.”  Acting “with the intention or the purpose to deceive 
or to cheat” is incompatible with acting in good faith, and thus it was unnecessary for the 
district court to give an additional good faith instruction.  See id. at 644, 651–52 (holding 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give a good faith 
instruction when the court instructed the jury on the intent element and described “intent 
to defraud” as acting “knowingly and with the purpose to deceive or to cheat”).  Thus, we 
find no error in the failure to give a separate good faith instruction. 
IV. 
Kismat also argues that the district court committed plain error in instructing the 
jury on the elements of bank fraud.  18 U.S.C. § 1344 provides: 
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or 
artifice—  
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(1) to defraud a financial institution; or  
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or 
other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a 
financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises;  
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 
years, or both. 
 
The district court instructed the jury that to find the defendants guilty, the government 
had to prove each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First that . . . Ramil Kismat and/or Sergey Sorokin knowingly executed a 
scheme to obtain the money, funds, or other property owned by or under 
the control of [the allegedly victimized financial institutions] by means of 
material false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises as 
detailed in Count 1 of the indictment, second, that Ramil Kismat and 
Sergey Sorokin did so with the intent to defraud these institutions, and 
third, that any of these financial institutions were then insured by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
 
Kismat asserts that the district court impermissibly combined the two allegedly distinct 
subsections of § 1344 into a single count and failed to instruct the jury that it had to reach 
a unanimous verdict as to which of the separate sections he allegedly violated.  There was 
no improper conflation of distinct subsections.  Our caselaw makes clear that intent to 
defraud a financial institution is an element of both subsections (1) and (2).  See Leahy, 
445 F.3d at 642–43; United States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190, 196–99 (3d Cir. 2002).  The 
instructions here required that the jury find all of the elements of subsection (2), and thus 
it is apparent that Kismat was convicted under § 1344(2).  There was no error in the 
instruction. 
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V. 
 For the reasons stated above, we reject Kismat’s claim that the combination of the 
failure to instruct on the good faith defense and the alleged deficiencies in the bank fraud 
instruction amounted to plain error warranting reversal. 
VI. 
Kismat next claims that there was insufficient evidence of his fraudulent intent to 
support the bank fraud and wire fraud convictions.  In reviewing whether the evidence 
was sufficient to support a guilty verdict, “[w]e must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government, and will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Leahy, 445 
F.3d at 657 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The guilty verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.  Kismat argues that the 
evidence showed that he acted in good faith and describes his shopping patterns as 
merely an “oddity.”  From the evidence described above, the jury was entitled to disagree 
and conclude that Kismat in fact was attempting to conceal his use of the cards 
containing the compromised account information, which is hardly consistent with his 
claim that he was using the cards in good faith.   
VII. 
 Kismat also argues that the district court’s intended loss finding of $432,118.29, 
which equaled the aggregate credit limit of the compromised accounts used, is 
unsupported by the evidence.  He claims that he had no knowledge as to the actual credit 
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limits of the cards, neither defendant admitted to intending to use the cards to their limits, 
not all of the cards were used until they were declined, and there was no evidence 
showing how he obtained the compromised accounts that would shed any light on his 
intent. 
The loss to be used for sentencing purposes shall be “the greater of actual loss or 
intended loss.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 n.3(A) (2013).  “Intended loss” means (I) “the 
pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense; and (II) includes intended 
pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur.”  Id. § 2B1.1 
n.3(A)(ii).  A district court errs by simply equating the intended loss of a credit card fraud 
scheme with the cards’ aggregate credit limit without “‘deeper analysis.’”  United States 
v. Diallo, 710 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Geevers, 226 F.3d 
186, 192 (3d Cir. 2000)).  The facts of the case must support a finding that the aggregate 
credit limit was the intended loss.  Id.  Even though a defendant might not expect to cause 
the entirety of the potential loss (here, the aggregate credit limit), “expectation is not 
synonymous with intent when a criminal does not know what he may expect to obtain, 
but intends to take what he can.”  Geevers, 226 F.3d at 193.  A district court may find 
that a defendant intended to cause the entirety of the potential loss, even if the actual loss 
is much lower, if the failure to cause the entirety of the potential loss is due to third-party 
intervention or the defendant’s desire to avoid detection.  See id. (approving the use of 
the face value of worthless checks used in a “check kiting” scheme as the intended loss, 
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despite acknowledging that a check kiter “will either abscond or be discovered before 
exhausting the kite”). 
The district court engaged in the “deeper analysis” our cases require.  The court 
cited Diallo and Geevers in explaining its intended loss finding and gave specific reasons 
for its conclusion.  Based on the evidence presented, the court found that had the 
defendants, as a practical matter, been able to charge each of the accounts to its limit 
before being detected, they would have done so.  A majority of the cards were used 
multiple times unless or until they were declined.  For those cards that were not used until 
they were declined, the district court found that the defendants discontinued their use in 
order to avoid detection of their scheme.  This finding is consistent with the evidence 
showing the defendants’ rather extensive steps to conceal their use of the compromised 
accounts, such as traveling long distances to make purchases, engaging in only a handful 
of transactions at each store, and switching registers.  The district court thus did not 
clearly err when it found that the defendants, had it been feasible, would have charged up 
to the credit limit on each account.  See id. 
VIII. 
Kismat’s final claim is that the district court erred by applying a four-level 
enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines based upon a finding that the offense 
involved fifty or more victims.  See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B).  Kismat argues that only 
the financial institutions should be considered victims because they were the only ones 
who suffered pecuniary loss; the individual account holders likely did not suffer any 
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actual loss, because they presumably were reimbursed by their banks.  To support his 
position, Kismat relies on United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Kennedy, however, was decided before the definition of “victim” for purposes of 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) was amended.  Under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B), “victim” 
now includes “any individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or 
without authority.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) n.4(E).  “Means of identification” for 
purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7), and includes any 
“access device.”  See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 n.1.  An “access device” is: 
any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, mobile 
identification number, personal identification number, . . . or other means of 
account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access 
device, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that 
can be used to initiate a transfer of funds. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1029(e).  Credit card and debit card account numbers clearly fall within the 
definition of “access device” as “account numbers” that can be used “to obtain money, 
goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of 
funds.”  Each individual account holder whose account number was used unlawfully or 
without authority therefore was a “victim,” and the district court correctly found that 
there were more than fifty such victims in this case.  The four-level enhancement thus 
was proper. 
IX. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm. 
